Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review
Volume 7

Number 3

Article 2

6-1-1984

The Fine Line between the Enforcement of Human Rights
Agreements and the Violation of National Sovereignty: The Case
of the Soviet Dissidents
Jennifer Noe Pahre

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer Noe Pahre, The Fine Line between the Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements and the
Violation of National Sovereignty: The Case of the Soviet Dissidents, 7 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 323
(1984).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol7/iss3/2

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Fine Line Between the Enforcement of
Human Rights Agreements and the

Violation of National Sovereignty:
The Case of the Soviet Dissidents
I.

INTRODUCTION

The plight of Soviet dissidents' has captured the sympathies and
interest of Americans for a number of years. These dissidents have
consistently received prominent coverage in the nation's major newspapers throughout the last decade,2 and they have been the object of
much political debate between the United States and the Soviet
Union.3 Most recently, the particular case of the Sakharovs has gen4
erated tremendous public interest and concern in the United States.
1. For the purpose of this analysis, "dissident" shall mean any person (1) who places
himself in opposition to a policy or policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which
the Party defines as important, and (2) who makes his dissention known beyond his immediate
family. This definition is tolerably consistent with the definition of "dissident" given by the
Soviet authorities: "renegades... the open opponents of socialism-insignificant little groups
of people who represent no one and nothing, far from the Soviet people, and who exist solely
because they are supported, paid and extolled by the West." Chto skryvayets'a za shumikhoy o
"pravakh cheloveka" (What's hidden behind the fuss about "human rights"), Pravda, Feb. 12,
1977, at 4, col. 1. This definition is also consistent with Amnesty International's definition of a
"prisoner of conscience": "men and women detained anywhere for their beliefs, colour, sex,
ethnic origin, language or religion, provided they have not used or advocated violence." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1983, Amnesty Int'l Pub. No. POL 01/01/83, title page
(1983) [hereinafter cited as AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT].
2. For instance, in three months chosen at random from the past decade, the Los Angeles Times printed a total of eleven articles, primarily in the first section. L.A. Times, Jan. 1,
1976, sec. I, at 4, col. I; id. Jan. 7, 1976, sec. I, at 25, col. 6; id. Jan. 11, 1976, sec. I-A, at 5, col.
2; id. Jan. 16, 1976, sec. I, at 2, col. 1; id. Jan. 20, 1976, sec. I-A, at 7, col. 1; id. Oct. 17, 1980,
sec. V, at 14, col. 1; Conine, Chafing Under the Soviet Paw, id. Oct. 27, 1980, sec. II, at 9, col.
1; Gillette, Soviet Jewish Dissident Sentenced, FriendsSay, id. Nov. 15, 1981, sec. I, at 22, col.
1; Gillette, Ethnic GermansArrestedfor ProtestIn Moscow, id. Nov. 17, 1981, sec. I, at 12, col.
1; id. Nov. 17, 1981, sec. I, at 12, col. 2; Wood, Armenian Church Thrives Despite Soviets, id.
Nov. 27, 1981, sec. I-A, at 10, col. 1.
3. Most recently, during Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's visit to the United States
in October, 1984, both President Ronald Reagan and former Vice President Walter Mondale
presented him with lists of dissidents about whom they were concerned. See Getting Together
But Staying Apart, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 1984, at 18, 21.
4. Dr. Sakharov is a prominent Soviet Physicist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate whose
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Most Americans, rooted in the constitutional precepts of individual freedom, have sympathy for any group of people whose individual
rights are not protected. Americans often turn to their most representative branch of government, the United States Congress, whenever
they want their concern for individual rights reflected in foreign policy. Congress has persistently conveyed public concern to the Kremlin by resolution, letter, and personal dialogue. 5
The Soviet Union considers these governmental policies contrary
to international law 6 since they are an intervention in Soviet internal
affairs. 7 Many Americans, on the other hand, believe the United
States has a legal right, as well as a moral duty, to enforce the human
rights clauses of international agreements, and that this justifies Congressional action. 8 The conflict between these two interpretations of
international law will be the fundamental focus of this Comment.
The Soviet Union is a party to several international agreements

which contain human rights clauses. This Comment will begin with
an analysis of the relevant provisions of these agreements, and will
provide an overview of their historical background.

Alleged Soviet

violations of these agreements will be documented. From this perspective, the Comment will then analyze the legal right of the United
States to act on behalf of Soviet dissidents. This particular analysis
requires an understanding of the Soviet view of the human rights
granted by these agreements, as well as their views on national sover-

eignty and self-determination in this field. Finally, this Comment will
efforts were instrumental in the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. Recently, his
views on the use of nuclear weapons have led to conflicts with the Soviet regime. His wife's
illness and her desire to emigrate to the West for medical treatment have further intensified
this conflict, ultimately leading to a hunger strike by Sakharov. One way in which the American public has responded is by generating grass-roots petitions on Sakharov's behalf, culminating in Sakharov Day, 1983. See Eaton, Soviet Chills US Idea of Rights Link to Arms, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1983, at A9, col. 1. Scientists have been especially active on Sakharov's behalf.
See Austin, Sakharov Telegrams Made Public, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1980, at A4, col. 1.
5. One of the most recent personal contacts was a Congressional delegation's visit to
Moscow in January of 1984. L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1985, sec. I, at 7, col. 1. The Soviet Union,
feeling this pressure from Congress, has gone so far as to blame Congress for President Jimmy
Carter's speeches on human rights. See Vishnevskiy, Contrary to Logic, Contrary to Facts,
Pravda, June 11, 1977, at 5, col. 2.
6. For a discussion of Soviet views on international law, see Tunkin, The Contemporary
Soviet Theory of InternationalLaw, 31 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 177 (1978).
7. See Vishnevskiy, supra note 5.
8. See, e.g., Henkin, Human Rights andDomestic Jurisdiction,HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Buergenthal,
Domestic Jurisdiction,Intervention, and Human Right" The InternationalLaw Perspective,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 111 (Brown & MacLean eds. 1979).
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discuss some of the traditional options pursued by the United States
to counter Soviet human rights violations, and will suggest some further options, with an eye towards discovering how the United States
can cause the Soviet Union to significantly change her treatment of
dissidents.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

A.

The InternationalBill of Human Rights

The Soviet Union is a party to three relevant human rights treaties: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,9 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."I Known together as
the "International Bill of Human Rights," these three agreements are
the most comprehensive and significant documents of the United Nations on the issue of human rights. 12 In addition, the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of August 1,
197513 (Helsinki Final Act), will be considered. The Helsinki Final

Act is the most recent international agreement discussing a broad
range of human rights to which the United States and the Soviet
Union are both parties. 14
9. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal
Declaration].
10. G.A. Res. 2200(XI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Social Covenant] (entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976, in accordance with
Article 27). The United States has not yet ratified this covenant.
11. G.A. Res. 2200(XI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Political Covenant] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1975, in accordance with
Article 49). The United States has not yet ratified this covenant.
12. These agreements are singled out in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, also known as the Helsinki Final Act [hereinafter cited
as Helsinki Final Act], "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe," part (a), Section VII
(Basket I), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 161 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977). See also HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/I/Rev.1 (1978) (represents U.N. practice).

13. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have
signed this Act. However, it is not legally binding and therefore not open to ratification. Its
complete text may be found in HUMAN DIGNITY: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS 135-203 (A. Henkin ed. 1979). Every country in Europe, with the exception of Albania, was a party to the Final Act, as were the United States and Canada.
14. For instance, the 1975 Declaration on the Rghts of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res.
3447(XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR C.3 (2433d mtg.) at 921, U.N. Doc. A/10284/Add.1 (1975), and
the 1975 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452(XXX), 30
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The International Bill of Human Rights has its origins in the
1945 United Nations Charter (Charter) drawn up at the end of World
War II. Article 1, section 3, of the Charter provides that one purpose
of the United Nations shall be "[t]o achieve international cooperation
in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ..

"5 In addition,
"

Article 56 of the Charter pledges all member states "to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."16 Article 55 encourages
the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of" the
human rights mentioned in Article 1, section 3.17

Recognizing that the terms used in the 1945 Charter had been
left undefined, 18 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 217A(III), known as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Universal Declaration), in 1948.19 This document specifically
defined the "fundamental freedoms" referred to in the first article of
the Charter.
The nature of these freedoms seems to reflect the dominance of
the United States in world affairs at that time. For example, most of
the rights in the Universal Declaration parallel those in the United
States Bill of Rights. Freedom of "thought, conscience and religion,"' 20 and of "opinion and expression,"' 2' are guaranteed, as is the
freedom to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers. ' 22 The Universal Declaration
states that each person has a "right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association,

to leave

. . .

' 23

and to "freedom of movement.

and return to his country.

' 24

.

.[and the] right

U.N. GAOR C.3 (2433d mtg.) at 624, U.N. Doc. A/10408 (1975), as well as other international agreements, are not discussed.
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
16. Id. art. 56.
17. Id. art. 55, para. (c).
18. Leary, The Implementation of the Human Rights Provisions of the Helsinki Final
Act-A PreliminaryAssessment: 1975-1977, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE HELSINKI ACCORD 111, 112 (T. Buergenthal ed; 1977).
19. Universal Declaration, supra note 9.
20. Id. art. 18; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 19.
22. Id.
23. Id. art. 20.
24. Id. art. 13.

Soviet Dissidents

1984]

The Universal Declaration also protects the individual against
"arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,

' 25

and against "torture or

. .

. cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment. ' 26 The individual must be given a fair
trial27 at which he is innocent until proven guilty, 28 and may not be
arbitrarily arrested, detained, or exiled. 29 Furthermore, the right to
seek asylum from persecution is established.30 This emphasis upon
individual political, religious, social, and economic rights was a reaction to the human rights violations which occurred immediately prior
1
to and during World War 11.3
The Charter had also established a Commission on Human
Rights to submit reports, proposals, and recommendations on various
topics within the field of human rights, and to develop an Interna32
tional Bill of Rights based upon those rights granted in the Charter.
Because these rights fell into two broad categories, the Commission
felt it would be best if each group of rights were put into separate
covenants. 33 The final result was thus two covenants: the Interna34
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Political Covenant)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
35
Rights (Social Covenant).
These Covenants reflect a much more sophisticated and precise
elaboration of human rights than the earlier concept of "fundamental
freedoms" enunciated in the Charter, making it easier to identify specific human rights violations. This sophistication is best evidenced by
the provisions of the Political Covenant. It replaces the Universal
Declaration's basic provisions guaranteeing freedom from arbitrary
25. Id. art. 12.
26. Id. art. 5.
27. Id. art. 10.
28. Id. art. 11.
29. Id. art. 9.
30. Id. art. 14.
31. See Humphrey, The Universal Declarationof Human Rights: Its History, Impact and
JuridicialCharacter,HuMAN RIGHTS THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE HELSINKI DECLARATION
21 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1979). See also the Preamble of the Universal Declaration, which
provides in part: "[w]hereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind ....
Universal Declaration, supra
note 9, preamble.
32. Hoare, The UN Commission on Human Rights, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 59 (E. Luard ed. 1967).
33. Id.
34. See Political Covenant, supra note 11.
35. See Social Covenant, supra note 10.
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arrest and the right to a fair trial with an article detailing the right to
liberty and security of person, the right to be informed of any criminal
charges made, the right to a speedy trial or to immediate release, and
the right to compensation in the event of unlawful arrest or detention. 36 The Political Covenant also adds freedom from involuntary
scientific experimentation to the Universal Declaration's provision
37
against torture.
The Political Covenant's provision for the right of peaceful assembly and association elaborates the Universal Declaration's simple
statement that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. ' 38 The Political Covenant divides this right into

39
two separate sections.
Significantly, the Political Covenant incorporates a so-called "escape clause" 4 into its freedom of expression provision that enumerates the restrictions which may be imposed upon the enjoyment of
this freedom. It provides that the rights may be curtailed if necessary
for "national security or public safety, public order... the protection
of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms
'41
of others.
Similarly, the Political Covenant combines the Universal Declaration's freedom of expression and freedom to seek, receive and impart information regardless of frontiers,4 2 into a more precise
provision giving "the right to hold opinions without interference" 43 a
special, preliminary place. This section also includes an escape clause
similar to the limitations placed upon the freedom of expression. 4
The Political Covenant provision granting the freedom of movement
45
and repatriation also adds this same escape clause.
Both the Political and Social Covenants have provisions which
state that the Covenants' provisions may not be used to imply "any
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
36. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 9.
37. Id. art. 7.
38. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 20.
39. Political Covenant, supra note 11, arts. 21, 22.
40. An "escape clause" will be construed to refer to any clause in a human rights agreement which limits the full enjoyment of any rights provided for elsewhere in the agreement.
41. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 19(3)(b).
42. Id. art. 19(2).
43. Id. art. 19(1).
44. Id. art. 19.
45. Id. art. 12(3).
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destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein." '4 6
These provisions become most significant when viewed together with
the Covenants' identical clauses stating that "[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development. '4 7 As will be discussed below, these provisions
provide the Soviet Union with one basis for their interpretation of
international law. The Soviet Union can and does claim that discussion of Soviet human rights violations is interference with the Soviet
48
Union's political policy.
B.

The Helsinki FinalAct

The Helsinki Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975, is another
principal human rights agreement signed by the USSR. This Act is
not legally binding, as it is a "Declaration on Principles," not a
treaty. 49 It flowed from Soviet efforts to obtain formal recognition of
the boundaries in Eastern Europe resulting from World War 11.50
The Helsinki Final Act arises from a rather problematic political situation: no peace treaty had ever been drawn up at the end of World
War II in Europe, the various arrangements regarding former German territory had led "to solutions of debatable effect," and Europe
had become an arena for East-West ideological confrontation. 51 In
addition, then Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev was determined to
present the conference which generated the Helsinki Final Act (called
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) as a great
success for Soviet multilateral diplomacy. 52 Confronted with the insistence of the Western and neutral states, Premier Brezhnev was
compelled to concede points on humanitarian contacts so that the
46. Id. art. 5(1).
47. Id. art. 1.
48. See text accompanying notes 125-36.
49. "[T]he participating states did not intend to bind themselves legally, and they expressly noted that the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating
States does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other
agreements and arrangements." Bastid, The Special Significance of the Helsinki Final Act,
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccoRD 11, 13 (T.Buergenthal
ed. 1977).

50.

Scrivner, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Implicationsfor

Soviet-American Detente, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 122, 148 (1976).

51.
52.

Bastid, supra note 49, at 15.
Jonathan & Jacques, Obligations Assumed by the Helsinki Signatories, HUMAN
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccoRD 43, 45 (T.Buergenthal ed.
1977).
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Conference would not fail altogether. 53 The Eastern bloc therefore
gave humanitarian and cultural questions a special place on the Conference's agenda. 54 This part of the agenda became known as "Basket
III."55
Basket III is one of the three topical groups into which the Act's
provisions are organized. Basket I is entitled "Questions Relating to
the Security in Europe," and Basket II is called "Co-operation in the
Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment." Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act is entitled "Co-operation
in Humanitarian and Other Fields." It outlines plans in various areas, such as family reunification and exchange of scientific information, designed to "facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually
and collectively;" ' 56 "facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds . . . and the exchange of information with
other countries; '57 and "facilitate. . . the further development of exchanges of knowledge and experience." 58 The spirit of Basket III is
perhaps more significant than its vague provisions dealing with its implementation: in Basket III, the participating states "[d]etermine...
to co-operate among themselves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create better conditions in the
above fields." 59 This language exemplifies the spirit of detente prevalent in 1975.
Three clauses contained in Basket I are also of importance for
the analysis of human rights. In the most important of these, the participating states reaffirm that:
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements
53.
54.

Id.
Id.

55. Id. Because this last basket was the price the Soviet Union paid for the recognition of
Eastern European boundaries, "an unyielding insistence on compliance with these provisions
was imperative to maintain the bargain." Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights Law and
the Helsinki FinalAct: Conclusions, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 3, 9 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977).
56. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, "Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields,"
sec. 1, preamble (Basket III).
57. Id. sec. 2, preamble.
58. Id. sec. 4, preamble.
59. Id. "Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," preamble.
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in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on
Human Rights, by which they may be bound. 60

Given the fact that the United States Senate has not ratified the International Covenants, this clause is critical if the United States is to
have a legal basis for discussing the implementation of these Covenants with the Soviet Union, because the United States has signed this
Act.

61

There are two other clauses in the Helsinki Final Act which are
important for this analysis. These are the clauses guaranteeing the
right of self-determination of all peoples, under which each state may

determine its own internal political status, 62 and the right of sovereign
equality of all states, which includes territorial integrity, political in63
dependence, and the right of each state to determine its own laws.
III.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

While the United States' implementation of these human rights
agreements has certainly not been perfect, 64 Soviet compliance may,
65
by the Western standard used here, be judged as most unimpressive.
The Soviet concept of freedom of speech differs dramatically from the
United States' ideal; 66 over 200 people were arrested in the Soviet
60. Id. "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe," part (a), sec. VII (Basket I).
61. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
62. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe,"
part (a), sec. VII (Basket I).
63. Id. sec. I.
64. President Carter admitted this in a news conference in 1977: "We are a signatory of
the Helsinki Agreement. We are ourselves culpable in some ways for not giving people adequate right to move around in our country or restricting, unnecessarily in my opinion, visitation to this country by those who disagree with us politically." Leary, supra notel8, at 113.
Perhaps one reason why Western human rights violations do not seem to be as extensively
documented as Eastern violations is that there are very few Helsinki monitoring groups in the
West which concentrate on violations of human rights by their own governments. Id. at 127.
While the question of Western violations is certainly an interesting one, it is beyond the scope
of this Comment.

65.

See Dep't of State, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1981, 887 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as COUNTRY REPORTS]. It
should be noted that all groups which monitor the human rights situation in the Soviet Union
have difficulty getting accurate information out of that country. Their findings should therefore be assessed with that fact in mind.
66. Id. at 892-93. Under the Soviet Constitution of 1977, Article 50 grants "[flreedom of
speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations." Article 39, however, states that "'enjoyment by citizens of their rights and freedoms must not be to the detriment of the interests of the society or the state;' "this restriction effectively nullifies Article 50.
Id. at 892.
PRACTICES,
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Union in 1982 "solely for expressing views. . . disapproved of by the
authorities." 67 This is in direct violation of Articles 18 and 19 of both
the Universal Declaration and the Political Covenant, as described
above, which provide for freedom of expression and belief. Of those
persons arrested in 1982, Western sources estimate that more than
68
half were arrested because of their religious views.
One religious group which suffers special persecution in the Soviet Union is the Jews, many of whom seek to emigrate to Israel.
Merely applying for emigration can bring on "a variety of administrative and extra-legal sanctions, including loss of employment, harass69
ment, social ostracism, and long delays" for the applicant.
Although Jews are by far the majority group seeking to emigrate, they
are not the only such national group: at least nine Soviet Germans
and sixteen other nationals were arrested or tried in 1982 in connection with their campaign to emigrate. 70 This violates the freedom of
movement guarantees of the Universal Declaration and the Political
71
Covenant.
In addition, in the Soviet Union, the ostensible right of choosing
one's place of residence is not completely upheld. Resident permits
for those living in some large cities are restricted in number, and
"[c]ertain national minorities such as Crimean Tatars, Meshki and
Volga Germans are prevented from returning to their traditional
''
homes from which they were deported during World War II. 72
Furthermore, these and other minority groups may be prevented
from practicing their cultural traditions at all. "The teaching of Jewish cultural traditions is actively discouraged; groups which promote
the Ukrainian language are jailed; Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians are persecuted for seeking to preserve their national identities; and
Muslims in Soviet Central Asia face systematic efforts to eradicate
67. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 284.
68. Id. Most of those arrested were members of Baptist congregations who refuse to
register with the authorities because of the restrictions such registration entails. These restrictions include controls on the election of church leaders, on the upbringing of children according to their religious beliefs, and on preaching their religion openly. In addition, those arrested
included at least eight members of the Russian Orthodox Church, thirteen Muslims, and eight
Jews.
69. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 65, at 895.
70. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 285.
71. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 13; Political Covenant, supra note 11, art.
12.
72. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 65, at 894.
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Islamic traditions and customs. 73 This appears to be in direct violation of the clauses in the Universal Declaration and the Political Covenant which provide for the free enjoyment of one's cultural
heritage.

74

One of the most unfortunate facets of the Soviet system for the
citizen trying to promulgate his religion, national identity, or political
views is the ease with which he may be arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted. Provisions for such arrests are within the Soviet criminal code
itself,75 and provide the basis for the arrest of most political prisoners
in the USSR. 76 Such arbitrary arrest clearly violates the provisions of
the Political Covenant, which states that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention.

'77

Once the dissident has been arrested, the Soviet Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that he may be detained for up to nine months
before trial. 78 Detentions before trial have, on occasion, exceeded one
year. 79 If one assumes that nine months does not constitute "a reasonable time" for pre-trial detention, this violates Article 9 of the
Political Covenant.80 When a trial finally occurs, its chances of being
fair and impartial seem remote: "there is no known instance of an
73. Id. at 893.
74.
26(2).
75.

Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 27; Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art.
For example, Article 190-1 of the Soviet Criminal Code provides that "[t]he dissemi-

nation of deliberately hostile fabrications slandering the Soviet state and social system" may be
punished by up to three years' imprisonment; Article 190-3 provides that "[t]he organization
of, or active participation in, a group actively violating public order" carries a maximum penalty of three years' imprisonment; Article 70 states that "[a]nti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" is punishable by up to seven years' imprisonment and an additional five years' internal
exile; "[t]he infringement of the person and the rights of citizens under the appearance of
performing religious ceremonies" carries. a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment
under Article 70; and, finally, treason, which includes unlawful attempts to leave the country
under Article 64, is punishable by death, although fifteen years' imprisonment and five years'
internal exile are frequently imposed for such attempts. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 65, at
890.
Beyond the provisions in the Criminal Code, the KGB seems to have special authority to
power
arrest. As V. Gsousky, a Soviet theorist, has written, "the law gave [the KGB] the
to imprison by an administrative procedure, those. . . whom any court, even the most severe,
would. . . acquit." Grzybowski, PenalRegimes and Dissenters in the Soviet Orbit, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRODS. 289, 292 (1979). Arbitrary arrest violates the provisions of the Political
Covenant, supra note 11, art. 9(1).
76. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 283-84; COUNTRY

supra note 65, at 890.
77. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 9(1).
78. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 65, at 890-91.
79. Id. at 891.
80. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 9(3).
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acquittal verdict in a political trial since the Bolshevik Revolution" in
1917.81 This violates the provisions for fair trial in both the Universal
82
Declaration and the Political Covenant.
After the inevitable conviction, many political prisoners are sent
to labor camps or psychiatric institutions.8 3 Frequently, labor camps
operate under harsh regimes and do not provide prisoners with proper
diet or medical care.8 4 In the Soviet penal system, political prisoners
qualify to be put in the harshest correctional labor camps along with
murderers, armed robbers, those who have committed treason, and
repeat offenders of lesser crimes. 85 The psychiatric institutions are
perhaps even worse: "the 'patients' are kept under control by 'therapy' which amounts to little more than torture through the administration of unbalanced doses of powerful and painful drugs such as
sulphazin, insulin, sanapax, seduxin and motiden-depo," 8 6 haloperidol, chlorpromazine, trifluoperazine,8 7 aminazine, 88 and triftazine8 9
Moreover, the "patients" are subjected to immobilizations and beatings in these institutions. 90 Such treatments must be considered torture, 9 1 and violate both the Universal Declaration and the Political
Covenant. 92 In addition, it is possible to consider some of these drug
treatments to be scientific experimentation and thus violative of Arti93
cle 7 of the Political Covenant.
It should be noted, however, that the psychiatric cases are by
their very nature ambiguous, because of the difficulty in identifying
81.
82.
14(1).

supra note 65, at 891.
Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 10; Political Covenant, supra note 11, art.
COUNTRY REPORTS,

COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 65, at 888-89.
84. Id. at 889.
85. Grzybowski, supra note 75, at 293.
86. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 65, at 889.
87. TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES, Amnesty Int'l Pub. No. ACT/04/01/84 at 221 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as TORTURE].
88. Comment, Soviet Abuse of PsychiatricCommitment: An InternationalHuman Rights
Issue, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 629, 643 (1979).
89. POLITICAL ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE USSR, Amnesty Int'l Pub. No. EUR 46/
01/83 at 12 (1983) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL ABUSE].
90. Id. at 13.
91. For a description of the effects of some of these drugs, see Comment, supra note 88, at
643; and POLITICAL ABUSE, supra note 89, at 12. Amnesty International, following U.N.
practice, stresses the following definitional elements: severity of physical or mental pain suffered, the deliberateness of the act, the existence of purpose for the act, and the direct or
indirect involvement of state officials. TORTURE, supra note 87, at 13-14.
92. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 5; Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 7.
93. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 7.
83.
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the truly mentally disturbed. After all, both Westerners and Soviets
can agree to the proposition that "you have to be crazy to dispute the
94
party line," albeit for different reasons.
Finally, those citizens who openly air complaints about their illtreatment may find themselves re-arrested or re-confined to psychiatric hospitals. 95 This violates the right to receive remedy for human
rights violations guaranteed by Article 2, Section 3(a), of the Political
96
Covenant.
IV.

THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEED
IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

After the Political and Social Covenants were adopted in 1966,
the Soviet delegate to the United Nations said to the General Assembly: "Our task now is to see to it that these new Covenants are strictly
observed everywhere. '97 Despite extensive documents of Soviet violations, the Soviets have repeatedly claimed that they have accomplished this task in their country. 98 No doubt many Westerners are
confused by this contradiction between Soviet violations, as perceived
by the West, and the Soviet posture that no violations occur.
A. The Soviet Theory of Human Rights
One explanation for this phenomenon is that "the Marxist school
of thought.

. .

implies a theory of human rights with different char-

acteristics and based on different elements from those accepted in
what is generally known as the Western concept." 99 According to
Western conceptions, human rights are rights claimed against the
government by the individual. An individual need not have interests
which coincide with the interests of society in order to claim these
94. It could be speculated that the apparent use of psychiatric hospitals for the punishment of dissidents reflects a very sophisticated Soviet response to the much more precise formulation of human rights in the 1966 Political and Social Covenants---especialy since this
type of violation first appeared in the 1970's.
95. TORTURE, supra note 87, at 222.
96. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 2(3)(a) ("any person whose rights or freedoms
as herein recognized. . . shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity").
97. Ramcharan, Implementing the International Covenants on Human Rights, HUMAN
RIGHTS THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 159, 159 (B.G. Ramcharan
ed. 1979).
98. Pravda, supra note 1.

99.

Espiell, The Evolving Concept of Human Rights: Western, Socialist and Third World

Approaches, HuMAN RIGHTS THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 41, 55

(B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1979).
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rights. This Western conception of human rights is the one which
predominates in interpretations of international law.1°°
The Soviets, however, view human rights as collective rights, opportunities granted to society by its government. 10 ' Under this system, an individual who acts contrary to the interests of the collective
is violating the collective's human rights. On the other hand, in the
words of Yuriy Andropov when he was head of the KGB, "[a]ny citizen of the Soviet Union whose interests coincide with the interests of
10 2
society feels the entire scope of our democratic freedoms."'
This "collective" view of human rights leads to vastly different
definitions of fundamental freedoms than those which the Western
view espouses. According to the Soviet view, "freedom of information does not exist in the abstract but in a particular socioeconomic
context. . . information should promote the development of socialism and, thus, the eventual good of the people. . . [i]nformation is an
aspect of state policy and should be controlled by the state." 10 3 According to the Western view, however, freedom of information is a
right which should be left almost completely unfettered by the
state.1°4 This freedom should not be bound by national frontiers, and
wide dissemination of news will protect against the impact of
propaganda. 105
In addition, "socialist ideology defines liberty as a non-autonomous value, subordinate to the general interest of socialist society in
accordance with values determined by the state."' 1 6 In contrast,
Western society emphasizes the individual's freedom in his relation
07
with the state.'
One must consider, finally, the fundamentally hostile attitude of
the Soviet Union, as a Marxist-Leninist state, towards religious belief:s0 8 the Soviet Union is conducting an ongoing ideological struggle
against religion. 109 This struggle can be traced back to Karl Marx's
100. Id. at 42-44.
101. Dean, Beyond Helsinki The Soviet View of Human Rights In InternationalLaw, 21
VA. J. INT'L L. 55, 57, 58 (1981).

102. Id. at 63.
103. Leary, supra note 18, at 140-41.
104. Id. at 140.
105. Id.
106. Jonathan & Jacques, supra note 52, at 43-44.
107. Id. at 43.
108. Leary, supra note 18, at 134.
109. '[T]here can be no doubt that, throughout Eastern Europe, the socialist state
conducts an ideological struggle against religion. In the pursuit of this struggle, all
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belief that religion is "the sigh of the oppressed creature, . . . the

opium of the people." 110 Contrasted with this is the Western view of
general religious tolerance."1 '

Thus, there is a vast ideological gulf which separates the Soviet
and Western views of human rights. By relying upon the Marxist
view of these rights, the Soviet Union can "redefine" some of the enumerated Western rights in the Covenants and the Helsinki Final Act,

and then claim compliance with these newly-defined rights.112
B.

Soviet Use of Escape Clauses

The problem of interpretation is further compounded by the inclusion of the various escape clauses in the Political and Social Cove-

nants, which act as a restriction on the broad rights granted.1 13 For
instance, Article 19, Paragraph 2, of the Political Covenant states that
"[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right

shall include freedom, to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers .

.

14

Paragraph 3, however, contains a broad restriction that may be

11 5
used to severely restrict the right to information:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions . . . [which] are
necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others,
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order
1 16
• . .or of public health or morals.

For example, "[a] state which forbids the sale of foreign newspapers

for reasons of national security or public order could argue that it is
the resources of the Communist Party-the guiding party of society-and all the
organs of state engaged in the construction of a materialist society are mobilized. We
are therefore dealing in essence with an ideological process which, even if there is a
growing tendency to adopt compromises in practice, can admit of no ultimate
concession.'
Leary, supra note 18, at 58 n.159.
110. THE MARX-ENGELS READER 54 (R. Tucker ed. 1978) (emphasis in original).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
112. Leary, supra note 18, at 112.
113. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
114. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 19(2).
115. Frowein, The Interrelationshipbetween the Helsinki FinalAct, the InternationalCovenants on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccoRD 71, 76 (T.Buergenthal ed. 1977).
116. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 19(3).
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acting in accordance with the Covenant, interpreting Paragraph 3 literally.' 1 7 The same argument could apply to the official suppression
of dissident views.
Article 12 of the Political Covenant, which guarantees the right
to travel, freedom of movement, and freedom to leave any country,
includes substantially the same escape clause. The result of this inclusion is that "[t]hose socialist states that do not recognise a general
right to leave one's country interpret the restrictive clause as giving
the state very broad legislative freedom,""" despite the provision in
the Helsinki Final Act which "shows that the participating states regard it as important. . . that no state be permitted to keep its citizens
9
in complete isolation.""
This potential interpretation of escape clauses in the agreements
results in the limitation of the human rights accorded. In effect, the
Soviet Union imposes its domestic law over the rights guaranteed by
treaty so that these rights become merely co-extensive with Soviet
law.' 20 Thus, the Soviet Union and her allies "use as general principles the clauses that permit restrictions on the rights guaranteed by
the International Covenants . . .in effect, nullifying the grant[s] of
the fundamental right[s] ....,,121
C. The Soviet View of National Sovereignty and Self-determination
Perhaps the reason the Soviet Union places special emphasis on
the escape clauses of the agreements is that these clauses, in turn,
attach special importance to a nation's sovereign power to regulate for
the common good. Such clauses are closer to the Marxist-Leninist
interpretation of human rights because they emphasize the value of
the collective rather than the value of the individual. The Soviets acknowledge, however, that it is the Western conception of human
rights that predominates in international law.' 22 The Soviets argue
that the reason for this is that law, like all institutions, is a product of
economic relations, and bourgeois capitalism has been dominant in
the world system. 23 Until such time as socialism can dominate the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
(1978).
123.

Frowein, supra note 115, at 76.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Fryer, Soviet InternationalLaw Today: An Elastic Dogma, 83 MIL. L. REv. 21, 31
Id. at 26-34.
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international system, the USSR will always emphasize national sover24
eignty as a defense against bourgeois concepts of international law,'
which emphasize individual, not collective, rights.
To understand the Soviet concept of national sovereignty, it is
necessary to explore the closely-linked concept of self-determination.
The socialist countries believe that self-determination means that
"foreign states shall not interfere in the life of the community against
the will of the government."' 2 5 Thus, "self-determination becomes
tantamount to the right to nonintervention."'' 26 This should be contrasted with the Western view, which holds that self-determination is
27
the right of the people to choose their form of government.
An examination of the emphasis that the United States and the
USSR place on different provisions in the Helsinki Final Act makes
these different definitions of self-determination obvious. This Act
enumerates ten principles, "all of primary significance," which are to
guide relations between participating states. 28 The eighth principle
states:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political
status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish
129
their political, economic, social and cultural development.
The first provision enumerated in the Helsinki Final Act states:
[t]he participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of
every State to juridicial equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each
other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic, and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its
130
laws and regulations.
124. This "defensism," or a "minimum commitment approach to international law," has
been a Soviet characteristic since 1917. Fryer, supra note 122, at 29-30.
125. Cassese, The Helsinki Declarationand Self-Determination, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccoRD 83, 86 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977) (emphasis in
original).
126. Id. at 85.
127. Id. at 86.
128. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe,"
part (a), sec. VII (Basket I).
129. Id. sec. VIII.
130. Id. sec. I.
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Because the Marxist-Leninist countries emphasize the principles of
sovereignty and self-determination, "[iln their view, all other principles are subordinated to and all the parties to the Final Act [are] obli131

gated to maintain a strict respect for the internal rules of society"
as set forth in the principles above.

In contrast, the Western states emphasize the concepts enumerated in Principle 111, 132 which deal with human rights and became the

basis for Basket 111.133 The seventh Principle begins: "[tihe participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
for all
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,
134
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."'
The inevitable result of the differing emphasis placed upon these
principles is obvious. The Soviet Union will deem illegitimate any

attempted interference with its government's domestic policy-making
and call such interference a violation of Soviet national sovereignty,
while the West may consider such attempts quite acceptable. 135 Indeed, as one commentator points out, "[tihings have gotten to the
rights] is seen
point where the very mention of this subject [of 1'human
36
States.'
of
affairs
internal
the
in
as intervention
V.

THE VIEW OF THE WORLD COURT AND
THE SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES

It must be acknowledged that there is merit to the Soviet view of
national sovereignty. Each state alone has full knowledge of its domestic situation, and it alone bears responsibility for dealing with that
situation. 137 The state must have some leeway, or "margin of appreci131. Jonathan & Jacques, supra note 52, at 50. Consider the comment by one Soviet
participant at the 1977 Belgrade Follow-up to the Helsinki Conference that one of the most
significant results of that Conference was "the failure of the attempts... to drive the process
started in Helsinki into interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, which would
have been totally opposed to the letter and spirit of Helsinki." Yu.

KASHLEV, HELSINKI-

BELGRADE: THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT 81 (1978).

132.
133.
134.
part (a),
135.
136.

Jonathan & Jacques, supra note 52, at 50.
Id.
Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe,"
sec. VII (Basket I).
See Yu. KASHLEV, supra note 131, at 81.
Freymond, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, HUMAN RIGHTS THIRTY YEARS AF-

TER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 67, 72 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1979). For the reaction of
the Soviets to such "linkage," see Eaton, Soviet Chills U.& Idea of Rights Link to Arms, L.A.
Times, Jan. 17, 1985, sec. I, at 7, col. 1.
137. Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction,THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 286, 298 (E. Luard ed. 1967).
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ation," to be able to cope effectively with every contingency. 138 The
question, then, is where should the line be drawn? What is the extent
39
of this margin?'
Ideally, we should be able to refer this question to an international court or similar adjudicating body which could attempt to reconcile the Soviet and Western views of national sovereignty. The
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) seems a logical contender for
this role. Unfortunately, however, the Soviet Union has not accepted
compulsory I.C.J. jurisdiction, and the United States has done so only
with such restrictive conditions that the question of jurisdiction always remains in United States' hands.'14
Furthermore, the cases which the I.C.J. have considered have
done little to clarify the extent of this "margin of appreciation." Only
one I.C.J. case, Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Limited
(Belgium vs. Spain), 41 seems to provide any insight into the extent of
human rights enforcement in a world of sovereign states. In this case,
the court recognized the postwar development of human rights law
and noted that such agreements "create obligations erga omnes [toward all persons]."142 Nevertheless, the court restricted this language
in a later paragraph and emphasized "that universal human rights
instruments do not empower states parties to protect the victims of
human rights violations irrespective of nationality."1 43 The combination of these two references to human rights law leaves, as many com144
mentators have noted, "the impression of a self-contradiction."
Essentially, the court acknowledges that these agreements create obligations, but restricts the scope of enforcement of these obligations.
The extent of the restriction depends upon the interpretation of the
word "protect." If it refers to the use of force on behalf of these victims, such a limitation is hardly innovative.1 45 If "protect" refers to
the discussion of such violation between two states parties to an agreement, then such a limitation is in contradiction to the enforcement
138. Id. at 298.
139. Id. at 297-98.
140. S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT 73 (1973).
141. Barcelona Traction. Light & Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 32.
142. Frowein, supra note 115, at 71.
143. Id.
144. E. HAMBRO & A. ROVINE, THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 225
(1976).
145. For instance, the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, sec.
4. See also Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe,"
part (a), sec. VII (Basket I).
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clauses of the Political Covenant.146
There is, however, a newer source of international authority on
the extent to which national sovereignty can limit the obligations to
respect the human rights found in agreements. An international symposium held in 1984 focused on the escape clauses in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 14 7 This symposium included
high governmental officials and distinguished experts in international
law from seventeen countries, including representatives from Hungary, Poland, Egypt, India, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. The fact that such a diverse group reached a consensus
lends their findings great weight.
The symposium set forth a number of principles to evaluate a
country's claim that a given limitation of a right is justified. One
theme that recurs in these principles is that the limitations set forth in
the Political Covenant's escape clauses must not render this human
rights agreement impotent. The principles of the symposium declare
that the burden of proof must lie with the state seeking to justify a
limitation, that all limitation clauses must be interpreted "strictly and
in favor of the right at issue," and that any limitations must be open
to challenge and to effective remedy. 4 8 In addition, any limitation
based upon claims that it is necessary for "national security" or "public safety" must be in response to force, threats of force, or "danger to
the safety of persons, to their life or physical integrity, or serious dam'1 4 9
age to their property."
These principles would make it very difficult for the Soviet Union
to justify the limitations it places upon the exercise of human rights,
especially since the Soviet Union has emphasized the "insignificance"
of dissidents and their activities. 15° In addition, a symposium principle that "[a] limitation to a human right based upon the reputation of
others shall not be used to protect the state and its officials from public opinion or criticism"1 5' nullifies the Soviet prohibition of speech
considered "anti-Soviet slander or propaganda."' 5 2 Such prominent
communist officials as Hanna Bokor-Szego, Head of the International
Law Department of the Hungarian Academy of Science, and Andrzej
146. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
147. The Siracusa Principles, reprinted in 7 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 3-14 (1985).
148. Id. at 4-5.
149. Id. at 6.
150. See Pravda, supra note 1.
151. The Siracusa Principles, supra note 147, at 7.
152. See supra note 75 for the relevant sections of Soviet Law.
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Murzynowski, Director of the Polish Institute of Criminal Law, were
among those who signed this statement of principles. The fact that
the statement of principles was signed by such a diverse group which
includes such high communist officials indicates that the Soviets are
abusing the use of "escape clauses" from the point of view of an international consensus. The argument that "domestic jurisdiction" permits restrictions on human rights granted in the Covenants is not to
be found in the Siracusa Principles' discussion of justifiable limitations
on human rights. Such an analysis lends credence to the Western
interpretation of these agreements at the expense of the Soviet
interpretation.
VI.

TRADITIONAL UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

Most states agree that it is not "impermissible interference for
one state to shape its own policies in ways that will influence the behavior of other governments on human rights."1 53 This deliberate
structuring is inherent in a state's sovereignty, in its right to "develop
its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right
to determine its laws and regulations," 1 54 and cannot be considered
55
intervention.
One non-interventionary action a state may take is simply to criticize the action of another state, either expressly or via symbolic gestures. Putting aside criticisms in international forums, which must be
based upon violations of agreements, consider the wealth of criticism
aired in domestic forums such as speeches, press releases, and articles. 156 A prominent example of a symbolic gesture is the 1980
Olympic boycott. President Jimmy Carter refused to permit the
American team to attend the Olympics in Moscow as long as the Soviets remained in Afghanistan. One intent of such symbolic criticism
is to shame and embarrass the criticized country into discontinuing its
policy. 157
Another non-interventionary action is economic reprisals such as
trade boycotts. Economic reprisals may seek to compel a state to
153. Henkin, supra note 8, at 36.
154. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe,"
part (a), sec. I (Basket I).
155. Henkin, supra note 8, at 36.
156. See J. CARTER, KEEPING FArI 141-51 (1982).
157. For instance, non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International or
Freedom House have only the weapon of criticism in their arsenal. Obviously, their continued
existence shows that they believe it is an effective weapon.
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change policy by using the offending state's own economic needs as a
weapon. Such sanctions, however, are almost never effective.15 8 One
example is the 1980 United States grain embargo of the Soviet Union.
Because the USSR had invaded Afghanistan, President Carter refused
to sell the Soviets grain in 1980. Nevertheless, the Soviets simply responded by purchasing their grain from other sources. 59 As this example demonstrates, even if such sanctions seek to compel, they may
not be considered intervention simply because no state can be forced
to trade with another nation.
Non-interventionary policy options, when exercised, often appear to be of dubious effect. The enforcement clauses of various international agreements, however, provide another basis and means upon
which to attack human rights violations.
The enforcement clauses of the Political Covenant provide that
"[i]f a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another
State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party."' 6 The State Party receiving this
communication then has three months to respond with an explanation, a clarification, or a written statement referring to "domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter." 161 If
the two States Parties cannot resolve the matter within six months,
either state may refer it to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 162 established in the agreement. 163 The Committee then at164
tempts to use its good offices via negotiations to resolve the issue,
and if this effort is unsuccessful, the matter is referred to an ad hoc
1 65
Conciliation Commission.
In reality, however, these "enforcement" clauses do not provide
for enforcement at all, but merely set up a framework for discussing
158. Hart, Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in InternationalRelations, 30
INT'L ORGANIZATION 289, 294 (1979). Some argue that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has
been effective. It granted foreign countries most-favored nation status only if they permitted
free travel of their citizens to other countries. See Frumkin, We Can Make the Soviets Comply
on Human Rights, L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, see. II, at 5, col. 2. Nevertheless, the JacksonVanik Amendment is still in force and emigration is extremely low, suggesting that its success
was contingent upon detente. See infra note 179.
159. J. CARTER, supra note 156, at 477-78.
160. Political Covenant, supra note 11, art. 41(1)(a).
161. Id.
162. Id. art. 41(l)(b).
163. Id. arts. 28-39.
164. Id. art. 41, secs. (lXc)-(h).
165. Id. art. 42.
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violations. The most important part of this framework is neither the
Human Rights Committee nor the ad hoc Conciliation Commission;
rather, it is the legitimation of one state's serving upon another state a
written notice of suspected violations of guaranteed human rights.
Thus, the state receiving such notice cannot legitimately claim that
166
such allegations are an illegal intervention in its domestic affairs.
Unfortunately, the United States has not yet ratified the Political
Covenant, ruling out this form of written criticism. Under the Helsinki Final Act, however, the participating states, which include both
the United States and the USSR, agree:
to act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth
in the international declarations and agreements in this field [of
Covenants on
human rights], including inter alia the International
167
Human Rights, by which they may be bound.
Under this clause, if the Soviet Union is in violation of the Political
Covenant (or the Universal Declaration or the Social Covenant), it is
also in violation of the Helsinki Final Act, to which the United States
is a party. This fact is important because, in the absence of Senate
ratification of the International Covenants, there is no other legal basis for the United States to discuss the implementation of these covenants.168 The Helsinki Final Act's implementation clauses provide a
framework for such discussions, declaring that the participating states
will implement the Act's provisions "unilaterally in all cases which
lend themselves to such action; bilaterally, by negotiations with other
participating States; [and] multilaterally .... 169 If the Soviet
Union fails to implement the agreement unilaterally, then the United
States may have a duty to negotiate with the USSR bilaterally or multilaterally for the implementation of the agreement. This negotiation
would include the human rights clauses of the Political Covenant,
which are implicit in the Helsinki Final Act. Thus, the Helsinki Final
Act may give the United States the authority to make human rights a
subject of negotiation with the USSR, without illegally intervening in
the domestic affairs of another state.
As it stands, however, this right is not reciprocal, because the
166.
167.
part (a),
168.
169.

Henkin, supra note 8, at 22.
Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, "Questions Relating to the Security in Europe,"
sec. VII (Basket I).
Buergenthal, supra note 55, at 6.
Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, Follow-up to the Conference.
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United States, which has not ratified the Political Covenant, is not
subject to the same criticism from the Soviet Union as the Soviet
Union is subject to from the United States. Generally, international
agreements involve reciprocal concessions, and this lack of reciprocity
may make the United States' claim that it can criticize the USSR a
tenuous one. Nevertheless, the fact that the United States made concessions in fields other than human rights provisions may satisfy a
standard of reciprocity.1 70 If need be, the United States could renounce its boundary concessions made under the Helsinki Final Act
in retaliation for continued Soviet violations of the human rights
clauses.

17

1

Admittedly, the renunciation of any part of the Helsinki Final
Act would be a drastic action which the United States is not likely to
take in response to human rights violations. But there is another,
more easily used weapon within the Helsinki Final Act, namely, the
ability of the United States to strengthen or weaken the process of
detente1 72 in response to Soviet implementation or lack of implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The
Act is explicitly tied to detente. In the Preamble, the participating
states declare that they are "[c]onvinced of the need to exert efforts to
make detente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope, and that the implementation of
the results of the Conference. . .will be a major contribution to this
process ....,,173 In addition, the participating states are
"[d]etermined. . .to give full effect to the results of the Conference
and to assure. . . the benefits deriving from those results and thus to

broaden, deepen, and make continuing and lasting the process of
detente."'' 74 Thus, although the Helsinki Final Act is not a binding
agreement, any "failure to fulfill [its] moral and political obligations
would entail a loss of prestige and credibility, resulting in a deterioration . . . [of the offending state's] political relations and thus in
170. Other authors, using different analyses, have also concluded that the United States
has a legal right to these types of intervention. See Buergenthal, supra note 55, at 6; Henkin,
supra note 8, at 22; Frowein, supra note 115, at 80; and Scrivner, supra note 50, at 147.
171. Salter, American Lawyers and Russian Dissident" The Lawyer as Social Engineer, 12
INT'L LAW. 869, 875 (1978).

172.
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384 (2d ed.

1978) (defines "detente" as "a lessening of tension or hostility, esp. between nations, as
through treaties, trade agreements, etc.").
173. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, Preamble to "Questions Relating to the Security in
Europe" (Basket I) (emphasis in original).
174. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 12, Preamble.

1984]

Soviet Dissidents

detente." 75
This argument is predicated upon the basic notions that the Soviet Union desires detente and that it is willing to improve its human
rights climate to achieve detente. These assumptions are valid.
Detente has long been a major goal of Soviet foreign policy, 176 and
statistics indicate that emigration quotas may be raised during periods
of detente. 177 For example, in 1979, the emigration of Jews reached
an all-time peak of 51,320. This number dropped dramatically when
American-Soviet relations soured after the invasion of Afghanistan,
178
All
and again after Ronald Reagan's ascension to the Presidency.
of this evidence demonstrates that it is possible to use detente as a
weapon in pursuit of human rights goals.
VI.

CONCLUSION

All of the traditional policies directed at assisting the Soviet dissident have failed to acknowledge the fundamental differences in
United States and Soviet interpretations of human rights, national
sovereignty, and self-determination. In addition, such policies have
failed to consider the general Soviet view of international law. Because of the importance of national sovereignty to the Soviets, the
USSR has always insisted that the state, not the individual, is the only
proper subject of international law. 79 International human rights
agreements impose duties upon states to implement and enforce these
rights for their citizens,18 0 and the USSR has at least formally introduced these rights into its legal system.' 8 ' Such implementation follows, of course, the Soviet interpretation of what these rights really
are:182 an individual's interests must "coincide with the interests of
175. Jonathan & Jacques, supra note 52, at 53.
176. The classic example of this is Brezhnev's speech to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. See L. BREZHNEV, WE ARE OPTIMISTS (1981). See also M.
GOLUBNICHY, DETENTE: THE ONLY WAY

(1978).

177. J. CARTER, supra note 156, at 149.
178. Id. Of course, the decline of the emigration figures may not be entirely due to American efforts supported by detente. Yet, as others have argued, "[w]ithout the collaboration of
the U.S. government, the congressional branch in particular, it is virtually certain that the
Jewish emigration campaign against the Soviet Union would not have succeeded in facilitating
the emigration of well over 100,000 Jews." Wirsing, The UnitedStates and InternationalProtection of Minorities, THE DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 157, 184
(N. Hevener ed. 1981).
179. Dean, supra note 101, at 78.
180. Id. at 73.
181. Id. at 76. For a more detailed discussion, see Leary, supra note 18, at 111-60.
182. Dean, supra note 101, at 77.
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society" to enjoy his rights in full. From a Western standpoint, this
standard does not go far enough. The net result of these varying
stances is that, when negotiating and signing human rights agreements, the United States and the USSR were "'either speaking a different language or using the same words to speak of different

realities.'

"183

The first step, then, must be to recognize these different realities.
The United States must realize that the Soviet Union will always
place clauses emphasizing national sovereignty higher than clauses
calling for the promulgation of individual human rights because the
Soviet Union is a Marxist-Leninist state. Although international authority may lean towards the Western view, until a definitive authority such as the I.C.J. directly addresses the topic, the Soviet Union is
unlikely to change its position.
Next, it must be recognized that many goals of Western human
rights agreements are not compatible with the socialist goals of the
Soviet state. As it exists today, the Soviet Union will not encourage
freedom of expression, nor will it encourage a wide dissemination of
information; these two fundamental Western freedoms are completely
in opposition to Soviet goals. There are, however, some human rights
that do not directly contradict Soviet policy. One key to future success in negotiating with the Soviet Union regarding the dissidents will
be to focus on these rights.
Although the problem of the Soviet stance on non-intervention
may continue to plague agreements, by focusing on the human rights
that conflict least with Soviet policy the chances of compliance are
significantly augmented. For instance, following Helsinki, the Soviets
did take some steps apparently designed to aid family reunification,
such as lowering visa fees, and making the process of applying to emigrate both easier and less expensive. 1 4 Such rights as freedom from
loss of employment because of beliefs, freedom from arbitrary arrest,
freedom from imprisonment without trial, and freedom from torture
and experimentation in psychiatric institutions, do not pose the same
problems for the Soviet Union as do freedom of information and freedom of expression-they do not threaten the essential monopoly of
the Party over the exchange of ideas. The USSR would likely be less
opposed to negotiating about and complying with such rights.
It is precisely the lack of freedom of information and of expres183.
184.

Leary, supra note 18, at 141.
Id. at 132.
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sion which makes Soviet dissidents "criminals."' 8 5 To concentrate on
other rights would seem to ignore the central problem. It must be
pointed out, however, that all of these human rights are interrelated,
and are, in fact, meaningless without each other. Freedom of information and expression are not fulfilled unless there is also freedom
from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Nevertheless, by focusing on
a set of special freedoms and attaining compliance, it may be possible
to broaden the range of dissident activity without broadening Soviet
punishment for this activity.
Therefore, although the dissident may not legally criticize the Soviet state, perhaps such agreements could keep him or her out of a
psychiatric institution or a forced-labor camp. Additionally, perhaps
such agreements could limit the penalties for freedom of expression to
much shorter terms, or prevent retaliation for such expression on
family members.
These new international agreements would have to be very specific, and they would have to be reciprocal. They might call for time
limits for the implementation of these pledges, with some type of punishment if these time limits are not met. Given the nature of the international system, such punishments would be minor, such as the
official acknowledgement of the violation by the adjudicating agency.
Nevertheless, this would provide a legitimate, if limited, legal remedy.
Another possibility is for the Soviet Union and the United States to
agree to submit violation claims to binding arbitration. This is admittedly a naive solution, which would not be very palatable to either the
USSR or the United States. "Most governments and their populations continue to deem it improper to guide national conduct by deference to supra-national decision-making in critical areas," and thus
states avoid international tribunals. 86 Finally, the agreements could
be enforced by massive publicity of violations by an adjudicating commission.18 7 This last solution may offer the most hope. "There is no
government on earth that is not sensitive about its reputation and
good name. As communication between states increases, this sensitiveness grows greater.' 88 Massive publicity of these violations
would "prick" the pride the Soviets have in their legal system, by
pointing out inconsistencies between law and reality.18 9
185. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
186.
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Unfortunately, these proposals are all unlikely to be implemented, at least in the near future, for a variety of reasons. First, the
Soviet Union would desire a quid pro for any concession on human
rights, which the United States is not likely to give, especially since
such a major concession as post-war border recognition seems to have
been of limited effectiveness. In addition, the collapse of detente in
recent years eliminates a major reason for the Soviets to make concessions on human rights in order to improve their relations with the
United States. Therefore, it seems unlikely that any new human
rights agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States
will appear until detente re-emerges.
Furthermore, even when the word "detente" again characterizes
the relationship between the United States and the USSR, the United
States government will probably not be able to improve the situation
alone. "[A] single government, no matter how influential, cannot win
a battle which, given the advanced state of degeneration of international relations, will be long and difficult.' 190 Where the help will
come from, and when it will come, are questions earnestly debated by
both the dissidents and their Western supporters.
Jennifer Noe Pahre
190. Freymond, supra note 136, at 79.

